← All companies ← SPH Manual SPIR → ← RSVR Entertainment & Studios STRZ →

SPHR, Sphere Entertainment Co.

Entertainment & Studios capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Revenue is led by Ticketing and venue license fee revenues (46%) and Media Networks Revenue (36%), with 3 more lines behind.

Sphere is an experiential medium powered by advanced technologies, and MSG Networks operates two regional sports and entertainment networks, as well as a direct-to-consumer ("DTC") and authenticated streaming product.

The entire exterior surface of Sphere, referred to as the Exosphere , is covered with nearly 580,000 square feet of fully programmable LED lighting, creating the largest LED screen in the world and an impactful display for artistic and branded content.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SPHR · Sphere Entertainment Co.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.2B

+19.0% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $842M

Operating margin −11.4% 5-yr avg −30.2%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg −6%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 16% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −21%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 32% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Ticketing and venue license fee revenues at 46%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Ticketing and venue license fee revenues46%$561M
Media Networks Revenue36%$439M
Food, beverage and merchandise revenues8%$100M
Sponsorship, Signage, Exosphere Advertising And Suite Licenses8%$96M
Other2%$22M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2026
									Income statement
$989M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$790M	$608M	$571M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.4B	RevenueRevenue
28%	30%	30%	54%	112%	—	—	—	50%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($31M)	($46M)	$235M	($188M)	($166M)	($273M)	($341M)	($230M)	($155M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−3.2%	−4.3%	16.4%	−23.8%	−27.3%	−47.8%	−33.3%	−18.8%	−11.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($29M)	($20M)	$252M	($161M)	($168M)	$275M	($360M)	$57M	—	Pretax incomePretax
$7M	($8M)	$182M	($148M)	($194M)	$503M	($201M)	$33M	($70M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	40%	—	—	38%	—	42%	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$144M	$101M	$308M	($59M)	$141M	$154M	($20M)	$243M	$399M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$112M	$109M	$112M	$122M	$125M	$103M	$256M	$336M	$337M	Depreciation & amortizationD&A
($2M)	($35M)	($47M)	($103M)	$134M	($515M)	($124M)	($185M)	$82M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$187M	$184M	$455M	$456M	$757M	—	—	—	—	CapexCapex
18.9%	17.5%	31.7%	57.7%	124.4%	—	—	—	—	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$32M	($8M)	$196M	($181M)	$17M	—	—	—	—	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.3%	−0.8%	13.7%	−22.9%	2.7%	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($43M)	($83M)	($147M)	($515M)	($615M)	—	—	—	—	Free cash flowFCF
−4.3%	−7.9%	−10.2%	−65.2%	−101.2%	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M	—	$0	—	$0	$0	$9M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$294M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$50M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
($170M)	($238M)	($395M)	($123M)	($804M)	($654M)	($45M)	($4M)	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$15M	($9M)	($114M)	$593M	($30M)	$86M	$210M	($233M)	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$331K	$5M	$3M	$8M	($750K)	($2M)	($771K)	($469K)	—	Exchange-rate effectFX
($10M)	($140M)	($197M)	$419M	($694M)	($417M)	$144M	$6M	—	Change in cashΔ cash
-2%	-2%	8%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-8%	-5%	-5%	ROICROIC
0%	-0%	6%	-7%	-10%	19%	-8%	1%	-3%	Return on equityROE
0%	−0%	6%	−7%	−10%	19%	−8%	1%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$747M	$132M	$573M	$521M	$551M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$81M	$57M	$185M	$217M	—	—	—	—	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	—	—	$10M	$14M	$0	$12M	$14M	$18M	InventoryInvent.
—	$24M	$17M	$27M	$2M	$40M	$19M	$25M	$14M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$57M	$40M	$167M	$228M	($40M)	($7M)	($10M)	$4M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$624M	$866M	$810M	$784M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$474M	$510M	$730M	$961M	$692M	$1.4B	$743M	$640M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.8×	2.8×	2.6×	1.3×	0.9×	0.6×	1.1×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$2.7B	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$148M	$166M	$499M	$457M	$457M	$457M	$470M	$345M	$345M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$3.3B	$3.7B	$5.3B	$5.5B	$5.0B	$4.8B	$4.2B	$4.0B	Total assetsAssets
—	$55M	$34M	$1.7B	$996M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$830M	$780M	Total debtDebt
—	($1.1B)	($1.2B)	$188M	$248M	$1.1B	$799M	$309M	$229M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.6×	-8.2×	6.4×	-9.2×	-6.1×	—	-4.3×	—	-1.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	$662M	$845M	$3.0B	$3.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.0B	—	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$77M	$68M	$21M	$138M	$184M	$0	—	—	—	Redeemable interestsRedeemable
—	$14M	$12M	$12M	$12M	—	—	—	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.8%	3.4%	4.3%	8.9%	12.7%	11.0%	4.7%	4.8%	3.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$89M	—	—	—	—	$65M	$65M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
									Per share
24.0M	24.0M	34.9M	34.3M	34.3M	34.9M	35.3M	45.3M	36.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$41.22	$43.72	$41.10	$23.06	$17.75	$16.35	$29.00	$26.89	$37.63	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.29	$-0.34	$5.20	$-4.33	$-5.67	$14.39	$-5.68	$0.74	$-1.95	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.35	$-0.33	$5.61	$-5.28	$0.49	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.79	$-3.44	$-4.21	$-15.03	$-17.96	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$7.81	$7.67	$13.03	$13.31	$22.09	—	—	—	—	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$103.88	$107.20	$81.73	$63.31	$57.31	$73.97	$68.43	$49.30	$61.86	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−5.9%/yr	−8.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−22.4%/yr (4-yr)	−22.4%/yr (4-yr)
EPS	+14.4%/yr	−32.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+29.7%/yr (4-yr)	+29.7%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	−10.1%/yr	−9.6%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2018–FY2022cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2022 the business earned $17M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $125M it takes just to hold its position. It put $632M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($615M).

	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020	FY2019	FY2018
Reported net income	($194M)	($148M)	$182M	($8M)	$7M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$125M	+$122M	+$112M	+$109M	+$112M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$77M	+$71M	+$61M	+$35M	+$27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$134M	−$103M	−$47M	−$35M	−$2M
Cash from operations	$141M	($59M)	$308M	$101M	$144M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$125M	−$122M	−$112M	−$109M	−$112M
Owner earnings	$17M	($181M)	$196M	($8M)	$32M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$632M	−$334M	−$343M	−$75M	−$75M
Free cash flow	($615M)	($515M)	($147M)	($83M)	($43M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	-23%	14%	-1%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $125M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $632M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer ($60M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“As a result of the accounting error, the Company re-evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's internal control over financial reporting and identified a material weakness as of June 30, 2021, September 30, 2021, December 31, 2021 and March 31, 2022.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $309M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $521M − debt $830M

What this means
Netting $521M of cash and short-term investments against $830M of debt leaves $309M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -6%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -8%–8%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($134M) ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Are earnings backed by cash? 7.28×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $243M ÷ net income $33M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 4.8%

The count is rising

Stock compensation $59M (fiscal 2025), 4.8% of revenue · repurchases $50M · diluted shares +32.2% since 2022

What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $830M vs $67M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record —

Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +86%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.11/share (latest year $0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $62.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → −33% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −33% lately, median −24% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −20%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2023 · −47.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$784M

Cash & short-term investments$551M
Inventory$18M
Other current assets$215M

Current liabilities$640M

Debt due within a year$58M
Accounts payable$14M
Other current liabilities$568M

Current ratio1.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$144Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$58M due · $551M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$913M$133M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$158Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2022

Over the record, the business generated $637M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.0B · 320%
Buybacks$294M · 46%

Returned to owners$294M
520% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $294M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $675M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $294M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count50.1%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 36M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$367M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity15%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$16Mover 6 years since fiscal 2018 buying other businesses, against $2.0B of capital spent building over the 8-year record

$154M written down across 2 years (2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $67M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2018 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $345M against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2021	Mr. Dolan	$8.3M	−$741k	($148M)
2022	Mr. Dolan	$19.2M	$9.3M	($194M)
2023	Mr. Dolan	$16.3M	$12.1M	$503M
2024	Mr. Dolan	$27.4M	$29.2M	($201M)
2025	Mr. Dolan	$14.3M	$215.6M	$33M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio379:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$59M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 4.8% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Entertainment & Studios

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record
WMGWarner Music	$6.7B	47%	9.2%	13%	9%
TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc.	$4.7B	—	17.6%	8%2y	—
FUNCedar Fair	$3.1B	91%	14.2%	2%	6%
SPHRSphere Entertainment Co.	$1.2B	—	-21.3%	-6%	3%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation	$1.2B	30%	11.4%	8%	4%
BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A	$732M	—	-5.6%	-3%	-10%
LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc.	$382M	18%2y	-23.8%2y	-6%2y	—
RSVRReservoir Media Inc.	$176M	61%	21.8%	3%	25%
Group median	—	—	10.3%	3%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sphere Entertainment Co. has delivered.

Sphere Entertainment Co.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($33M) Net of stock comp (−$50M TTM)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings — on 36M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $229M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SPHR against another business →

The owners of SPHR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sphere Entertainment Co. (SPHR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPHR, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← SPH its page in the Manual SPIR →

Industry order: ← RSVR the Entertainment & Studios chapter STRZ →