Owner Scorecard


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SPIR, Spire Global Inc.

Telecom Operators capital-intensive Unprofitable

Spire Global Inc. designs, manufactures, integrates, and operates its own satellites and ground stations to deliver unique end-to-end comprehensive solutions.

As part of the transaction, a portion of the proceeds was used to settle a prior dispute with L3Harris Technologies, Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SPIR · Spire Global Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$72M
−35.2% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $92M
Cash burn · annual $66M
Runway 1.4 yrs

Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~78 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Subscription Based Contract Member (77%) and Non Subscription Based Contracts (23%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −101% through the cycle on a 40% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −21 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −44%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Subscription Based Contract Member is 77% of revenue, with Non Subscription Based Contracts the other meaningful line at 23%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Subscription Based Contract Member77%$55M
  • Non Subscription Based Contracts23%$16M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Aug 13, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue down 5.9% year over year

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$28M$43M$71M$98M$110M$72M$62MRevenueRevenue
$18M$25M$17M$39M$40M$29M$24MGross profitGross prof.
64%57%24%40%36%41%38%Gross marginGross mgn
80%140%104%69%66%111%117%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
73%73%31%28%26%51%56%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($26M)($68M)($79M)($59M)($69M)($96M)($89M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−91.3%−156.4%−111.5%−60.2%−62.7%−134.1%−142.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($32M)($38M)($99M)($78M)($103M)$55MPretax incomePretax
($33M)($38M)($99M)($78M)($103M)$51M($91M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($15M)($58M)($46M)($36M)($18M)($60M)($66M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$9M$18M$18M$22M$12M$13MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$10M($40M)$23M$10M$43M($142M)($2M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$10M$15M$21M$17M$27M$33M$34MCapexCapex
36.2%35.6%29.7%17.8%24.1%45.8%54.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($20M)($66M)($67M)($54M)($45M)($72M)($78M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−71.3%−153.3%−94.3%−55.0%−40.8%−101.0%−125.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($25M)($73M)($67M)($54M)($45M)($93M)($100M)Free cash flowFCF
−88.1%−169.2%−94.3%−55.0%−40.8%−129.4%−159.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$104M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
($10M)($119M)($44M)($5M)($14M)$151MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$17M$271M$26M$24M$19M($75M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
-41%-44%-38%-81%-102%-66%ROICROIC
-20%-109%-205%45%-63%Return on equityROE
−20%−109%−205%45%−63%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$16M$109M$70M$41M$19M$82M$92MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M$10M$14M$10M$12M$4M$6MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$6M$5M$8M$12M$15M$12MAccounts payablePayables
$2M$4M$9M$2M$334K($11M)($6M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$22M$132M$94M$72M$92M$94M$110MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$13M$25M$38M$49M$152M$72M$59MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×5.3×2.5×1.5×0.6×1.3×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$20M$49M$56M$60M$63M$81MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$0$54M$50M$51M$15M$15M$15MGoodwillGoodwill
$44M$290M$256M$239M$194M$211M$227MTotal assetsAssets
$27M$51M$98M$114M$99M$0$0Total debtDebt
$11M($58M)$28M$73M$79M($82M)($92M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.8×-5.9×-5.7×-3.1×-3.4×-12.9×-44317.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$93M$100M$165M$201M$205M$98MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
($49M)$190M$91M$38M($12M)$113M$144MShareholders’ equityEquity
7.6%26.8%16.2%13.3%18.1%26.1%23.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
17.6M62.1M17.5M19.6M24.2M32.0M35.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.62$0.70$4.05$4.99$4.57$2.24$1.74Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.85$-0.61$-5.66$-3.96$-4.28$1.61$-2.53EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.15$-1.07$-3.82$-2.74$-1.86$-2.26$-2.19Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.42$-1.18$-3.82$-2.74$-1.86$-2.90$-2.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59$0.25$1.20$0.89$1.10$1.03$0.94Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.77$3.06$5.21$1.93$-0.48$3.53$4.03Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.53 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/3.55 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.7%/yr+6.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.9%/yr+11.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-35.2%
    “Total revenue decreased by $38.9 million, or 35%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared with 2024. The decline was primarily driven by a $24.6 million reduction following the Maritime Transaction.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($72M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $20M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($93M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$51M($103M)($78M)($99M)($38M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12M+$22M+$18M+$18M+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$20M+$13M+$11M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$142M+$43M+$10M+$23M−$40M
Cash from operations($60M)($18M)($36M)($46M)($58M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$12M−$27M−$17M−$21M−$9M
Owner earnings($72M)($45M)($54M)($67M)($66M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$20M−$7M
Free cash flow($93M)($45M)($54M)($67M)($73M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-101%-41%-55%-94%-153%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $20M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($91M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($96M) ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $25M + ST investments $57M − debt $5M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $77M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 21 + DIO 0 − DPO 128 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -102%–-38%; -97% latest = NOPAT ($90M) ÷ invested capital $93M
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -97% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range -153%–-41%; latest ($72M) = operating cash ($60M) − maintenance capex $12M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -101% of revenue this year, a -83% median across 6 years. It chose to put $20M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($93M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($91M).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ($60M) ÷ net income $51M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.64×
    Expanding
    Capex $33M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Modest selling cost
    Selling and marketing $15M ÷ revenue $72M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 26.1%
    Stock pay, share count unread
    Stock compensation $19M (fiscal 2025), 26.1% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $72M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5M vs $21M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.21/share (latest year $1.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −120% → −86% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −120% early to −86% lately, median −111% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2021 · −156.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$110M
  • Cash & short-term investments$92M
  • Receivables$6M
  • Other current assets$12M
Current liabilities$59M
  • Accounts payable$12M
  • Other current liabilities$46M
Current ratio1.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.87×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.56×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$51Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−5.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$121Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$27MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10M$10M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$46Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$25M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity14%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$104Mover 2 years since fiscal 2021 buying other businesses, against $123M of capital spent building over the 6-year record

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Beside that spending sits $16M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2020 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 26.1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.$976M57%16.1%17%14%
GOGOGogo Inc.$910M85%1y28.4%5%7%
IRDMIridium Communications Inc$872M90%2y10.5%2%35%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.$273M90%2y-47.3%-6%10%
ADArray Digital Infrastructure Inc.$163M51%1.4%1%5%
UCLuCloudlink Group Inc.$81M43%-7.7%-145%3y2%
ANGHAnghami Inc.$78M25%-35.8%-107%1y-9%
SPIRSpire Global Inc.$72M40%-101.4%-44%-83%
Group median54%-3.1%-3%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Spire Global Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered25%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−160%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Spire Global Inc. (SPIR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPIR, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← SPHR its page in the Manual SPNT →

Industry order: ← SKM the Telecom Operators chapter T →