Owner Scorecard


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UP, Wheels Up Experience Inc.

Airlines capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

Wheels Up is a leading global provider of on-demand private aviation with a large, diverse aircraft fleet and a network of safety-vetted charter operators, all committed to safety and service.

Our offering is delivered through a mix of our membership program and charter solutions that strategically utilize our controlled aircraft fleet and charter operators to deliver a greater range of travel alternatives.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UP · Wheels Up Experience Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$736M
−7.0% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $720M 5-yr avg $1.1B
Gross margin 10% 5-yr avg 6%
Operating margin −27.0% 5-yr avg −29.6%
Owner-earnings margin −42% 5-yr avg −22%
Free cash flow margin −59% 5-yr avg −25%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 13% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −28% through the cycle on a 7.5% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on load factor against unit cost, and fuel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$385M$695M$1.2B$1.6B$1.3B$792M$736M$720MRevenueRevenue
$44M$60M$77M$39M$21M$59M$74M$70MGross profitGross prof.
11%9%6%2%2%7%10%10%Gross marginGross mgn
18%17%16%19%19%28%32%29%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%3%3%4%5%5%5%5%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($78M)($63M)($203M)($560M)($444M)($259M)($203M)($195M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−20.3%−9.1%−17.0%−35.4%−35.4%−32.7%−27.6%−27.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($107M)($85M)($197M)($555M)($486M)($338M)($291M)Pretax incomePretax
($96M)($79M)($190M)($555M)($487M)($340M)($294M)($303M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($25M)$210M$126M($231M)($665M)($78M)($166M)($247M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$38M$41M$34M$44M$37M$57M$61M$55MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$31M$244M$233M$192M($241M)$159M$21M($48M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M$7M$15M$84M$20M$123M$94M$178MCapexCapex
1.1%1.0%1.3%5.3%1.6%15.5%12.7%24.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($29M)$203M$111M($274M)($685M)($134M)($227M)($302M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−7.5%29.1%9.3%−17.4%−54.7%−17.0%−30.9%−42.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($29M)$203M$111M($314M)($685M)($201M)($260M)($425M)Free cash flowFCF
−7.5%29.1%9.3%−19.9%−54.7%−25.3%−35.3%−59.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$28M$0$0$75M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$8M$28K$485K$2MBuybacksBuybacks
($41M)$82M($39M)($175M)$41M($47M)$180MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$87M($63M)$374M$245M$301M$79M($99M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$0$0($5M)($4M)($450K)$2MExchange-rate effectFX
$21M$228M$462M($167M)($327M)($46M)($82M)Change in cashΔ cash
-29%-26%-220%-500%Return on equityROE
−29%−26%−220%−500%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$96M$313M$785M$586M$264M$216M$134M$86MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$79M$112M$38M$32M$24M$28MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$9M$29M$20M$12M$12M$2MInventoryInvent.
$21M$44M$43M$33M$30M$20M$27MAccounts payablePayables
$35M$45M$98M$26M$15M$15M$4MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$396M$933M$820M$434M$332M$249M$222MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$840M$1.1B$1.3B$908M$917M$908M$785MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.8×0.6×0.5×0.4×0.3×0.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$323M$318M$395M$338M$348M$220MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$4M$37M$437M$348M$218M$217M$210M$209MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$2.0B$1.9B$1.3B$1.2B$969M$927MTotal assetsAssets
$211M$0$253M$259M$408M$335M$602MTotal debtDebt
($102M)($785M)($333M)($5M)$192M$201M$516MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.7×-2.7×-21.4×-74.5×-10.8×-4.0×-2.2×-1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.1B$1.2B$1.7B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$0$2M$6MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$26M$6M$0$0$0$0Noncontrolling interestsNCI
($56M)$268M$730M$252M$97M($202M)($392M)($560M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.5%4.2%5.6%2.0%5.8%6.2%6.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
31.1M48.8M6.1M7.4M6.6M34.9M35.3M36.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.36$14.26$194.40$214.35$189.62$22.71$20.86$19.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.09$-1.61$-30.93$-75.33$-73.74$-9.74$-8.33$-8.37EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.93$4.15$18.11$-37.20$-103.70$-3.85$-6.44$-8.35Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.93$4.15$18.11$-42.64$-103.70$-5.75$-7.36$-11.74Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13$0.15$2.48$11.34$3.05$3.52$2.65$4.93Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.81$5.49$118.85$34.18$14.74$-5.79$-11.11$-15.48Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.57 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/7.94 into 2021 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×6 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×5.28 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/20 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.1%/yr+7.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+64.6%/yr+78.6%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($227M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $61M it takes just to hold its position. It put $32M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($260M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($294M)($340M)($487M)($555M)($190M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$61M+$57M+$37M+$44M+$34M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$45M+$46M+$26M+$89M+$50M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$21M+$159M−$241M+$192M+$233M
Cash from operations($166M)($78M)($665M)($231M)$126M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$61M−$57M−$20M−$44M−$15M
Owner earnings($227M)($134M)($685M)($274M)$111M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$32M−$66M−$40M
Free cash flow($260M)($201M)($685M)($314M)$111M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-31%-17%-55%-17%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $61M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $32M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $45M), owner earnings is nearer ($273M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($203M) ÷ interest expense $90M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $134M − debt $335M
    What this means

    Netting $134M of cash and short-term investments against $335M of debt leaves $201M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 12 + DIO 6 − DPO 11 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($191M) = debt $335M + equity ($392M) − cash
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -55%–29%; latest ($227M) = operating cash ($166M) − maintenance capex $61M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -31% of revenue this year, a -17% median across 7 years. It chose to put $32M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($260M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves ($273M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($294M) · cash from operations ($166M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.53×
    Expanding
    Capex $94M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $61M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $89M ÷ revenue $736M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 6.2%
    Stock pay, share count unread
    Stock compensation $45M (fiscal 2025), 6.2% of revenue · repurchases $2M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $736M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $335M vs ($658M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-10.30/share (latest year $-8.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-10.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −15% → −32% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −15% early to −32% lately, median −28% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2022 · −35.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$222M
  • Cash & short-term investments$86M
  • Receivables$28M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$106M
Current liabilities$785M
  • Debt due within a year$21M
  • Accounts payable$27M
  • Other current liabilities$738M
Current ratio0.28×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.28×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($563M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$21M due · $86M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.3× → 0.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($834M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$731M$129M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$627Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$285M29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring($2M)over 6 years since fiscal 2019 buying other businesses, against $347M of capital spent building over the 7-year record

$306M written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $131M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2019 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $210M against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$45M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 6.2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B15%11.1%6%22%
ULCCFrontier Group Holdings Inc.$3.7B-1.4%-24%-4%
CPACopa Holdings S.A.$3.6B14.0%15%21%
ALGTAllegiant Travel Company$2.6B11.7%6%11%
RJETRepublic Airways Holdings Inc.$1.7B10.3%5%10%
VTOLBristow Group Inc.$1.5B2.3%2%4%
UPWheels Up Experience Inc.$736M7%-27.6%-204%2y-17%
Group median6.3%4%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Wheels Up Experience Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−3%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−59%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Wheels Up Experience Inc. (UP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UP, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← UNTY its page in the Manual UPB →

Industry order: ← ULCC the Airlines chapter VTOL →