Owner Scorecard


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2432 · DeNA

Video games Asset-light compounder IFRS
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET
2432 · DeNA

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from DeNA’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 2432) →

Where the money comes from

on EDINET →

The biggest segment, Game, is also where the profit is made: 44% of revenue and 84% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Healthcare And Medical ran a ¥2.3B operating loss; New Businesses And Others ran a ¥1.6B operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Game44%¥64.4B84% of profit
  • Live Streaming27%¥39.8B11% of profit
  • Sports Smart City22%¥32.8B5% of profit
  • Healthcare And Medical6%¥8.7Bloss of ¥2.3B
  • New Businesses And Others2%¥2.5Bloss of ¥1.6B

From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥143.8B¥139.4B¥124.1B¥121.4B¥137.0B¥130.9B¥134.9B¥136.7B¥164.0B¥147.7BRevenueRevenue
¥62.8B¥74.9B¥92.6B¥79.4BGross profitGross prof.
52%55%56%54%Gross marginGross mgn
50%42%37%35%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥22.5B¥27.5B¥13.5B(¥45.7B)¥22.5B¥11.5B¥4.2B(¥28.3B)¥29.0B¥18.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.6%19.7%10.9%−37.6%16.4%8.8%3.1%−20.7%17.7%12.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥30.8B¥23.0B¥12.7B(¥49.2B)¥25.6B¥30.5B¥8.9B(¥28.7B)¥24.2B¥19.0BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥22.7B¥37.7B¥23.0B¥12.9B¥30.0B¥18.4B¥10.8B(¥10.8B)¥39.0B¥33.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥11.4B¥10.9B¥11.5B¥6.7B¥5.6B¥5.4B¥6.5B¥5.2B¥7.0BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥8.1B)¥3.3B(¥613M)¥50.6B(¥2.4B)(¥17.8B)(¥3.5B)¥11.3B¥9.7B¥7.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥2.7B¥5.4B¥2.5B¥3.4B¥500M¥624M¥3.5B¥4.3BCapexCapex
1.9%4.4%2.0%2.5%0.4%0.5%2.6%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥35.0B¥17.6B¥10.5B¥26.5B¥17.9B¥10.2B(¥14.4B)¥34.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
25.1%14.2%8.6%19.4%13.7%7.5%−10.5%21.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥35.0B¥17.6B¥10.5B¥26.5B¥17.9B¥10.2B(¥14.4B)¥34.7BFree cash flowFCF
25.1%14.2%8.6%19.4%13.7%7.5%−10.5%21.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥2.9B¥4.6B¥4.6B¥5.8B¥2.5B¥3.9B¥4.6B¥2.2B¥2.2B¥7.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥0¥0¥33.9B¥5.6B¥10.9B¥15.0B¥0¥10.7BBuybacksBuybacks
16%22%-31%13%8%5%-24%14%10%ROICROIC
18%11%7%-27%11%17%6%-18%10%8%Return on equityROE
16%9%4%−30%10%15%3%−20%9%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥57.0B¥103.7B¥101.4B¥73.5B¥97.3B¥78.3B¥97.7B¥71.4B¥92.8B¥103.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥26.8B¥23.3B¥20.5B¥24.7B¥24.3B¥22.9B¥24.5B¥22.5B¥34.3B¥22.4BReceivablesReceiv.
¥26.8B¥23.3B¥20.5B¥24.7B¥24.3B¥22.9B¥24.5B¥22.5B¥34.3B¥22.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥93.8B¥157.1B¥133.7B¥108.1B¥129.9B¥110.4B¥133.3B¥114.1B¥142.7B¥144.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥17.5B¥17.8B¥16.5B¥22.4B¥24.3B¥38.6B¥30.1B¥24.2B¥79.3B¥56.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.4×8.8×8.1×4.8×5.3×2.9×4.4×4.7×1.8×2.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥46.3B¥46.0B¥5.9B¥5.9B¥17.5B¥49.1B¥33.6B¥30.4B¥20.7BGoodwillGoodwill
¥298.3B¥344.6B¥296.5B¥255.7B¥327.1B¥340.6B¥348.9B¥335.7B¥394.2B¥333.2BTotal assetsAssets
¥9.8B¥7.1B¥8.1B¥7.4B¥6.7B¥12.3B¥12.9BTotal debtDebt
(¥63.7B)(¥90.2B)(¥70.2B)(¥90.3B)(¥64.7B)(¥80.5B)(¥90.1B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
20.2×-80.6×164.2×7.8×23.1×-34.3×24.4×5.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥169.4B¥200.7B¥188.3B¥180.5B¥223.7B¥177.9B¥158.1B¥157.1B¥241.7B¥232.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
151M151M151M151M130M130M122M122M122M122MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥953.56¥924.28¥823.00¥804.90¥1051.92¥1005.05¥1104.53¥1119.43¥1342.64¥1209.21Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥204.40¥152.38¥84.27¥-326.01¥196.83¥234.48¥72.51¥-234.82¥198.07¥155.95EPS (diluted)EPS
¥231.79¥116.55¥69.48¥203.75¥137.28¥83.38¥-117.76¥284.47Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥231.79¥116.55¥69.48¥203.75¥137.28¥83.38¥-117.76¥284.47Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥19.23¥30.81¥30.79¥38.56¥19.33¥30.01¥37.85¥18.25¥18.25¥59.31Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥18.01¥35.82¥16.36¥26.40¥3.84¥5.11¥29.02¥34.81Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1123.01¥1330.77¥1248.64¥1196.78¥1718.07¥1365.91¥1294.46¥1286.33¥1979.07¥1904.47Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.7%/yr+2.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.0%/yr (7-yr)+32.6%/yr
EPS−3.0%/yr−4.6%/yr
Dividends / share+13.3%/yr+25.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.9%/yr (7-yr)+16.3%/yr
Book value / share+6.0%/yr+2.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned ¥24.2B of profit into ¥34.7B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income¥24.2B
Owner earnings¥34.7B · 21% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥24.2B(¥28.7B)¥8.9B¥30.5B¥25.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥5.2B+¥6.5B+¥5.4B+¥5.6B+¥6.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥9.7B+¥11.3B−¥3.5B−¥17.8B−¥2.4B
Cash from operations¥39.0B(¥10.8B)¥10.8B¥18.4B¥30.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥4.3B−¥3.5B−¥624M−¥500M−¥3.4B
Owner earnings¥34.7B(¥14.4B)¥10.2B¥17.9B¥26.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue21%-11%8%14%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Peers, Video Games

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
EAElectronic Arts$7.5B75%20.1%19%29%
TTWOTake-Two Interactive$6.7B50%6.3%18%14%
RBLXRoblox Corporation$4.9B76%-28.8%-247%3y18%
9766Konami Group$3.1B44%4y19.1%29%
3659Nexon$3.0B70%4y30.6%15%37%
9697Capcom$1.2B56%4y36.9%34%19%
2432DeNA$932M54%4y11.8%10%14%
GCLGCL Global Holdings Ltd$239M29%-0.1%-10%-5%
Group median55%15.4%17%18%

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income ¥18.7B ÷ interest expense ¥3.8B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥103.0B − debt ¥12.9B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥90.1B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -31%–22%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥14.8B ÷ invested capital ¥142.5B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥33.4B ÷ net income ¥19.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 3% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −37.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥160.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested¥22.9B · 14%
  • Dividends¥30.6B · 19%
  • Buybacks¥65.3B · 41%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥42.1B · 26%
  • Returned to owners¥95.9B

    70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥30.6B as dividends and ¥65.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥65.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−19.0%

    The diluted count fell from 151M to 122M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥18.25/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 7% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DeNA has delivered.

DeNA’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, DeNA earns about ¥20.5B on its 13.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s — margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings — on 122M diluted shares; net cash ¥90.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 2413 its page in the Manual 2501 →

Industry order: the Video Games chapter 3659 →