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COSO, CoastalSouth Bancshares Inc.
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
We currently operate 11 retail banking branches in three primary markets, including the Lowcountry of South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, and metro Atlanta, Georgia.
We are a full-service commercial bank focused on delivering personalized service in an efficient and reliable manner to the small-to medium-sized businesses and individuals in our markets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 11/4–11/12 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net interest income+13.1%
“Net interest income for the year ended December 31, 2025 was $73.9 million compared to $65.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, an increase of $8.6 million, or 13.1%. This increase was primarily due to an increase in the average balance of our total interest-earning assets albeit lower yields on interest-earning assets; offset by a decrease in the average rate paid on interest-bearing liabilities.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Provision for credit losses+477.9%
“Provision for credit losses for the year ended December 31, 2025 was $3.2 million compared to $553 thousand for the year ended December 31, 2024, an increase of $2.6 million. This increase was primarily attributable to increased loan production and changes in economic factors, offset by decreases in reserves of individually analyzed collateral-dependent loans and other changes in loss rates.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%Below the cost of equityNet income $25M ÷ equity $260MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $5M − intangibles $2M)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 58%Efficient (<65%)Noninterest expense $48M ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 49%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 11.3%Well capitalizedEquity $260M ÷ assets $2.3B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 86%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.0B ÷ assets $2.3B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 4%LowProvision for credit losses $3M ÷ net interest income $74M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Rate-sensitive fundingNoninterest-bearing deposits $312M ÷ deposits $2.0B
What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
- Not enough data
What this means
Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership15.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the deposit base could leave overnight?≈36.19% — the sentence's $719.4 million over the $2.0B Deposits line (XBRL, FY2025)
“At December 31, 2025, our uninsured deposits were $719.4 million, or 36.2% of total deposits, compared to $667.4 million, or 36.4% of total deposits, at December 31, 2024.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSVNBank7 Corp. | $96M | 19% | 21% | 37% | 4.7% | 20% |
| WTBAWest Bancorporation | $95M | 14% | 14% | 49% | 2.6% | 16% |
| CHMGChemung Financial Corp | $95M | 10% | 12% | 68% | 3.0% | 28% |
| CBKCommercial Bancgroup Inc. | $90M | 14%2y | 14%2y | 50%2y | 3.4%2y | — |
| USCBUSCB Financial Holdings Inc. | $90M | 11% | 11% | 57% | 2.9% | 25% |
| NWFLNorwood Financial Corp. | $88M | 10% | 11% | 59% | 3.1% | 20% |
| COSOCoastalSouth Bancshares Inc. | $82M | 10%2y | 11%2y | 59%2y | 3.2%2y | 16% |
| PKBKParke Bancorp Inc. | $80M | 14% | 14% | 33% | 3.3% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 12% | 13% | 53% | 3.1% | 20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← CORZZ its page in the Manual COST →
Industry order: ← COLB the Banks chapter CPF →