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AURE, Aurelion Inc.
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 4%, above 12% in only 2 of 4 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMMar 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $3M | $2M | $349K | $640K | $143K | RevenueRevenue |
| $2M | $1M | ($1M) | ($7M) | ($10M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -0% | 14% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| — | 22.6% | -15.1% | -108.7% | -55.1% | Return on assetsROA |
| 48% | 25% | -17% | -226% | -63% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | — | — | — | −70% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 48% | 25% | -17% | -226% | -568% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| $1M | — | — | — | $1M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $6M | $7M | $6M | $18M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $3M | $3M | DepositsDeposits |
| $4M | $5M | $6M | $3M | $16M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 8.0M | 8.0M | 8.3M | 10.2M | 46.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.24 | $0.17 | $-0.13 | $-0.68 | $-0.22 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.14 | — | — | — | $0.02 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.50 | $0.67 | $0.75 | $0.30 | $0.34 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $0.50 | $0.67 | $0.75 | $0.30 | $0.04 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×4.55 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −43.5%/yr | −43.5%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −15.9%/yr | −15.9%/yr (3-yr) |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“However, in connection with the audit of our consolidated financial statements as of September 30, 2025, we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting, as defined in the standards established by Public Company Accounting…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -63%Loss on equityNet income ($10M) ÷ equity $16MIndustry peers: median -50%
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $14M − intangibles $512K)Industry peers: median -50%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 87.9%Well capitalizedEquity $16M ÷ assets $18M
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 15%Leans on wholesale fundingDeposits $3M ÷ assets $18M
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Not enough data
What this means
The deposit mix isn't cleanly tagged in the filings' structured data; the funding read above carries what is.
- Not enough data
What this means
Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$13K
- Receivables$13K
- Inventory$26K
- Other current assets$4M
- Other current liabilities$3M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VELVelocity Financial Inc. | $186M | — | — | 2.5%1y |
| NCTYThe9 Limited American Depository Shares | $16M | -54% | -54% | 0.6%1y |
| LDIloanDepot Inc. | $10M | — | — | 0.1%1y |
| TRONTron Inc. | $5M | -50% | -50% | -0.0%2y |
| CDChaince Digital Holdings Inc. | $2M | -15%2y | -15%2y | 0.8%2y |
| MTCMMTec Inc. | $808K | -89% | — | — |
| AUREAurelion Inc. | $143K | 4% | 4% | — |
| XPXP Inc. | as filed: R$7.4B | 22% | 22% | — |
| Group median | — | -33% | -15% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Aurelion Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Aurelion Inc.’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered−13%/yr’21→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $2M on 29M shares, a 4% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← AUNA its page in the Manual AVAL →
Industry order: ← ASST the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter AVX →