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AVBC, Avidia Bancorp Inc.
Avidia Bank is a Massachusetts-chartered stock savings bank, with its main office in Hudson, Massachusetts.
Consists primarily of taking deposits from the general public in our local markets and nationally for our payments related services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~45 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Operating income up 15.2% year over year
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net interest income+18.1%
“Net interest income increased $13.3 million, or 18.1%, to $86.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, from $73.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily due to an increase in the net interest margin to 3.29% for the year ended December 31, 2025, from 2.89% for the year ended December 31, 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -1%Loss on equityNet income ($3M) ÷ equity $379MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $12M − intangibles $0)Industry peers: median 12%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 85%High cost ratio (>75%)Noninterest expense $88M ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 57%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 13.4%Well capitalizedEquity $379M ÷ assets $2.8B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 75%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.1B ÷ assets $2.8B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 25%ElevatedProvision for credit losses $22M ÷ net interest income $87M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Not enough data
What this means
The deposit mix isn't cleanly tagged in the filings' structured data; the funding read above carries what is.
- Net charge-offs 0.96%Elevated lossesCharge-offs net of recoveries $21M ÷ loans $2.2B (avg of year-ends) · allowance held at 0.96% of loans
What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.
- Marks are smallPre-tax, as filed for FY2025: HTM at cost $13M − fair value $13M = $399K, against equity less goodwill (intangibles not separately tagged) $367M
What this means
Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap that only shows in this disclosure. Stated equity already carries every available-for-sale mark through accumulated other comprehensive income; the held-to-maturity book's gap sits outside equity, which is why it is read here. The figure is pre-tax as the filer states it — the true after-tax dent depends on a deferred-tax position the record does not carry. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on, which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMBCSouthern Missouri Bancorp Inc. | $183M | 11% | 12% | 57% | 3.2% | 12% |
| FSBWFS Bancorp Inc. | $153M | 13% | 13% | 66% | 4.1% | 25% |
| HBCPHome Bancorp Inc. | $149M | 10% | 12% | 61% | 3.6% | 27% |
| NECBNorthEast Community Bancorp Inc. | $105M | 11% | 11% | 44% | 4.7% | 17% |
| AVBCAvidia Bancorp Inc. | $104M | 3%2y | 3%2y | 83%2y | 2.9%2y | — |
| PBFSPioneer Bancorp Inc. | $96M | 6% | 6% | 71% | 3.4% | 26% |
| TSBKTimberland Bancorp Inc. | $83M | 12% | 13% | 56% | 3.5% | 25% |
| GCBCGreene County Bancorp Inc. | $75M | 15% | 15% | 53% | 2.5% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 11% | 12% | 59% | 3.4% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← AVB its page in the Manual AVBH →
Industry order: ← AVAL the Banks chapter AVBH →