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AVBH, Avidbank Holdings Inc.
We provide competitive deposit products and treasury management solutions with a high-touch, relationship-driven approach, guided by our commitment to being Responsive, Collaborative & Accountable—principles we embody in every client interaction.
The Bank operates with one branch located in San Jose, California and one loan production office in each of San Francisco, California and Redwood City, California.
We have banking relationships in 39 states with approximately 26% of our loan balances located outside of California as of December 31, 2025. -5- Strategic Focus We aim to drive sustainable organic growth by leveraging our established platform, capitalizing on market disruption, and adapting to an evolving banking landscape.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~43 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Operating income up 0.3% year over year
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -7%Loss on equityNet income ($20M) ÷ equity $281MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $0 − intangibles $0)Industry peers: median 11%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 58%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 10.9%Well capitalizedEquity $281M ÷ assets $2.6B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 85%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.2B ÷ assets $2.6B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 6%LowProvision for credit losses $5M ÷ net interest income $87M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Solid core depositsNoninterest-bearing deposits $557M ÷ deposits $2.2B · pays 3.42% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
- Net charge-offs 0.07%Disciplined bookCharge-offs net of recoveries $1M ÷ loans $2.0B (avg of year-ends) · allowance held at 1.04% of loans
What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership16.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 10.3% of revenue, equal to 10.1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the deposit base could leave overnight?≈41.88% — the sentence's $915.5 million over the $2.2B Deposits line (XBRL, FY2025)
“We estimate total uninsured deposits were $915.5 million and $632.6 million as of December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively, representing approximately 42% and 33% of our total deposit portfolio as of December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CHMGChemung Financial Corp | $95M | 10% | 12% | 68% | 3.0% | 28% |
| CBKCommercial Bancgroup Inc. | $90M | 14%2y | 14%2y | 50%2y | 3.4%2y | — |
| USCBUSCB Financial Holdings Inc. | $90M | 11% | 11% | 57% | 2.9% | 25% |
| NWFLNorwood Financial Corp. | $88M | 10% | 11% | 59% | 3.1% | 20% |
| COSOCoastalSouth Bancshares Inc. | $82M | 10%2y | 11%2y | 59%2y | 3.2%2y | 16% |
| PKBKParke Bancorp Inc. | $80M | 14% | 14% | 33% | 3.3% | 11% |
| AVBHAvidbank Holdings Inc. | $31M | 2%2y | 2%2y | 58%1y | 3.3%2y | 25% |
| BMRCBank of Marin Bancorp | $29M | 8% | 9% | 58% | 3.1% | 37% |
| Group median | — | 10% | 11% | 58% | 3.1% | 25% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← AVBC its page in the Manual AVGO →
Industry order: ← AVBC the Banks chapter AX →