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CPK, Chesapeake Utilities Corporation
We are an energy delivery company engaged in the distribution of natural gas, electricity and propane, the transmission of natural gas, the generation of electricity and steam, and in providing mobile compressed natural gas and other energy-related services to our customers.
Optimizing the earnings growth in our existing businesses, which includes organic growth, territory expansions, and new products and services.
Growth of Marlin Gas Services' CNG transport business and expansion into LNG and RNG transport services as well as methane capture.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Regulated Energy (74%) and Unregulated Energy (29%).
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 22% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 34% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →The biggest segment, Regulated Energy, is also where the profit is made: 74% of revenue and 87% of segment operating profit.
- Regulated Energy74%$688M87% of profit
- Unregulated Energy29%$272M13% of profit
- Other-3%($30M)
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $499M | $450M | $490M | $480M | $488M | $570M | $681M | $671M | $787M | $930M | $994M | RevenueRevenue |
| $86M | $90M | $95M | $106M | $113M | $131M | $143M | $151M | $228M | $256M | $271M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.2% | 20.0% | 19.3% | 22.2% | 23.1% | 23.0% | 21.0% | 22.5% | 29.0% | 27.5% | 27.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $73M | $75M | $78M | $82M | $94M | $113M | $124M | $115M | $162M | $193M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $45M | $58M | $57M | $65M | $71M | $83M | $90M | $87M | $119M | $140M | $150M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 39% | 20% | 27% | 26% | 25% | 26% | 27% | 24% | 27% | 27% | 27% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $104M | $110M | $117M | $103M | $159M | $151M | $159M | $204M | $239M | $234M | $308M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $32M | $36M | $40M | $45M | $58M | $63M | $69M | $66M | $66M | $92M | $92M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $25M | $13M | $18M | ($12M) | $24M | ($2M) | ($6M) | $43M | $47M | ($7M) | $58M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $170M | $175M | $240M | $185M | $166M | $187M | $128M | $189M | $355M | $449M | $502M | CapexCapex |
| 34.0% | 39.0% | 49.0% | 38.5% | 33.9% | 32.8% | 18.8% | 28.1% | 45.1% | 48.2% | 50.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $72M | $74M | $77M | $58M | $101M | $88M | $90M | $138M | $174M | $142M | $216M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.4% | 16.4% | 15.7% | 12.0% | 20.6% | 15.4% | 13.2% | 20.6% | 22.1% | 15.3% | 21.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($66M) | ($65M) | ($123M) | ($82M) | ($7M) | ($36M) | $31M | $15M | ($116M) | ($215M) | ($194M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −13.2% | −14.5% | −25.1% | −17.0% | −1.4% | −6.4% | 4.5% | 2.2% | −14.7% | −23.1% | −19.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $12M | $17M | $24M | $22M | $36M | $12M | $925M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $17M | $20M | $22M | $25M | $27M | $32M | $35M | $40M | $54M | $61M | $64M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $706K | $721K | $23M | $16M | $5M | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($170M) | ($187M) | ($257M) | ($187M) | ($182M) | ($223M) | ($137M) | ($1.1B) | ($350M) | ($436M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $67M | $78M | $140M | $85M | $19M | $74M | ($21M) | $907M | $114M | $196M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $1M | $1M | $475K | $896K | ($3M) | $1M | $1M | ($1M) | $3M | ($6M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 9% | 10% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 10% | 11% | 11% | 7% | 9% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $4M | $6M | $6M | $7M | $3M | $5M | $6M | $5M | $8M | $2M | $400K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $63M | $77M | $54M | $50M | $57M | $58M | $63M | $72M | $77M | $102M | $92M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $57M | $75M | $99M | $54M | $60M | $53M | $61M | $78M | $78M | $115M | $94M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $6M | $3M | ($45M) | ($5M) | ($3M) | $6M | $1M | ($6M) | ($2M) | ($14M) | ($1M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $141M | $179M | $192M | $135M | $136M | $170M | $194M | $186M | $204M | $237M | $188M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $334M | $413M | $528M | $423M | $329M | $376M | $369M | $386M | $419M | $530M | $595M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.4× | 0.4× | 0.4× | 0.3× | 0.4× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $987M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $3.1B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $84M | $87M | $77M | $79M | $125M | $124M | $150M | $116M | $101M | $104M | — | Regulatory assetsReg. assets |
| $44M | $147M | $143M | $134M | $149M | $145M | $148M | $209M | $200M | $203M | — | Regulatory liabilitiesReg. liab. |
| $15M | $20M | $22M | $33M | $39M | $45M | $46M | $508M | $508M | $508M | $508M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $149M | $207M | $328M | $486M | $522M | $568M | $600M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $145M | $201M | $322M | $479M | $519M | $563M | $594M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $11M | $13M | $16M | $22M | $22M | $20M | $24M | $37M | $68M | $73M | $74M | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| 8.1× | 7.2× | 5.9× | 4.8× | 5.2× | 6.5× | 5.9× | 4.1× | 3.3× | 3.5× | 3.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $446M | $486M | $518M | $562M | $697M | $774M | $833M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 15.6M | 16.4M | 16.4M | 16.4M | 16.8M | 17.6M | 17.8M | 18.4M | 22.5M | 23.5M | 24.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $31.95 | $27.45 | $29.86 | $29.16 | $29.11 | $32.32 | $38.23 | $36.38 | $34.94 | $39.59 | $41.20 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.86 | $3.55 | $3.45 | $3.96 | $4.26 | $4.73 | $5.04 | $4.73 | $5.26 | $5.97 | $6.23 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.61 | $4.50 | $4.70 | $3.50 | $6.01 | $4.98 | $5.05 | $7.49 | $7.71 | $6.05 | $8.97 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-4.21 | $-3.98 | $-7.49 | $-4.97 | $-0.39 | $-2.07 | $1.72 | $0.81 | $-5.14 | $-9.15 | $-8.02 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.12 | $1.22 | $1.34 | $1.50 | $1.62 | $1.79 | $1.98 | $2.17 | $2.41 | $2.58 | $2.66 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $10.88 | $10.70 | $14.64 | $11.23 | $9.87 | $10.60 | $7.21 | $10.23 | $15.77 | $19.10 | $20.80 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $28.57 | $29.68 | $31.57 | $34.14 | $41.57 | $43.91 | $46.77 | $67.59 | $61.70 | $68.06 | $69.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.4%/yr | +6.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.1%/yr | +0.1%/yr |
| EPS | +8.5%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +9.7%/yr | +9.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.5%/yr | +14.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.1%/yr | +10.4%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $142M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $92M it takes just to hold its position. It put $357M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($215M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $140M | $119M | $87M | $90M | $83M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$92M | +$66M | +$66M | +$69M | +$63M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$9M | +$8M | +$8M | +$6M | +$6M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$7M | +$47M | +$43M | −$6M | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | $234M | $239M | $204M | $159M | $151M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$92M | −$66M | −$66M | −$69M | −$63M |
| Owner earnings | $142M | $174M | $138M | $90M | $88M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$357M | −$290M | −$123M | −$59M | −$124M |
| Free cash flow | ($215M) | ($116M) | $15M | $31M | ($36M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 22% | 21% | 13% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $92M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $357M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $134M.
A regulated utility reads differently here. What it spends above depreciation goes into rate base, where the commission lets it earn the allowed return and recover the capital, with interest, over decades — growth that is financed, not taken out of owners' pockets this year. So the truth sits between the bridge's two ends: owner earnings excuses the build-out entirely, free cash flow charges it entirely, and the scorecard's utility-plant figure shows how fast the base earning that return is compounding.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
The allowed return, earned and credited
- Earned return on equity 10.5%Earning the allowed returnMedian over 10 readable years · latest FY2025: 8.8% (net income $140M ÷ equity $1.6B)
What this means
A commission caps what a regulated utility may earn on shareholders' capital, so the question is not whether the return is high but whether the company actually earns what it is allowed — persistent under-earning means costs the regulator will not put in rates, and a return above the band usually means unregulated businesses in the mix. Read through the record, because a single year carries rate-case timing noise.
- AFUDC in earnings —Not enough data
What this means
The equity allowance for funds used during construction is not tagged in this filer's structured data — the construction credit, if any, lives in the 10-K's rate-matters note.
The invested base and the regulatory ledger
- Utility plant in service $2.9BGrowing ≈ 13.3%/yrPlant in service at original cost, before depreciation, as filed · FY2016→FY2025: $958M → $2.9B, ≈ 13.3%/yr
What this means
The closest filed figure to the rate base — the invested capital the commission sets the allowed return on. Its growth rate is the utility's reinvestment runway: under regulation, earnings power compounds roughly as fast as the base the return is earned on, funded by capital the regulator lets the company recover with interest. Rate base itself is not tagged in any structured filing, so this is the proxy, labeled as what it is.
- Regulatory assets & liabilities $104M / $203MOwes ratepayersRegulatory assets $104M · regulatory liabilities $203M · net $99M liability position, as filed
What this means
The ledger of the regulatory relationship: assets are costs the commission has agreed the utility may collect from ratepayers in future rates, liabilities are amounts it must give back. Both are promises whose worth depends entirely on the commissions that made them — which is why they are shown as filed and never netted into earnings adjustments here.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $930M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
What this means
Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $1.5B vs $1.6B equity
What this means
Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +117%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.79/share (latest year $5.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $66.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 19% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 26% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 17.2% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +4.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Rate cases, in the filing’s words
A regulated utility does not set its own price. It asks a commission for one, case by case, and the commission grants some part of it. Below are the proceedings this filing puts on the record, quoted verbatim, largest dollars first. Nothing here is computed; every figure is the filer’s own sentence.
- FPU Electric Rate Caserequested by the filer$12.6 million
“In August 2024, our Florida Electric division filed a petition with the Florida PSC seeking a general base rate increase of $12.6 million with a ROE of 11.3 percent based on a 2025 projected test year.”
- Delaware Natural Gas Rate Caserequested by the filer$12.1 million
“In August 2024, our Delaware natural gas division filed an application for a natural gas rate case with the Delaware PSC seeking approval of the following: (i) permanent rate relief of approximately $12.1 million with a ROE of 11.5 percent; (ii) proposed changes to depreciation rates which were part of a depreciation study also submitted with the filing; and (iii) authorization to make certain changes to tariffs.”
- Delaware Natural Gas Rate Casegranted by the commission$6.1 million
“A settlement among the Company, PSC staff and the Delaware Division of the Public Advocate was reached and approved by the Delaware PSC in June 2025 providing an annual revenue increase of $6.1 million, as well as dividing the rate case into two phases.”
- Maryland Natural Gas Rate Caserequested by the filer$2.6 million
“In August 2024, the Maryland natural gas distribution businesses, the Maryland OPC and PSC staff reached a settlement which provided for, among other things, an increase in annual base rates of $2.6 million.”
Sentences from the Regulatory Matters and Pending Proceedings disclosures and the MD&A of the latest 10-K, largest dollars first, at most six. “Granted” marks a sentence in which the commission itself is the subject of the approving verb; everything else renders as a request, never as a decided outcome. A return on equity is shown only where the filer states one between 8 and 13 percent — the same figure in these filings also carries equity ratios and fair-value returns, and a number that must be interpreted before it can be believed is not shown at all. Nothing here says whether a case is still pending: filings state timings that are already past by the time they are read.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$400K
- Receivables$92M
- Other current assets$95M
- Debt due within a year$132M
- Accounts payable$94M
- Other current liabilities$369M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$2.2B · 142%
- Dividends$333M · 21%
- Buybacks$44M · 3%
- Returned to owners$377M
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $333M as dividends and $44M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $149M to $1.4B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $44M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count54.5%
The diluted count rose from 16M to 24M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$2.58/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained18%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($438M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $77M, so each retained $1 added about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $10M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2010 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Householder | $2.8M | $6.1M | $88M |
| 2022 | Mr. Householder | $2.8M | $1.7M | $90M |
| 2023 | Mr. Householder | $3.3M | $3.4M | $138M |
| 2024 | Mr. Householder | $4.2M | $5.3M | $174M |
| 2025 | Mr. Householder | $4.5M | $5.5M | $142M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.9% of revenue, equal to 3.3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Gas Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | Plant growthannualized over the record | Dividend / cashmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UGIUGI Corporation | $7.3B | 14% | 10.0% | 25% |
| ATOAtmos Energy Corporation | $4.7B | 9% | 13.2% | 25% |
| SRSpire | $2.5B | 8% | 8.3% | 29% |
| OGSONE Gas | $2.4B | 8% | 7.4% | 28% |
| NJRNew Jersey Resources | $2.0B | 12% | 8.6% | 39% |
| SWXSouthwest Gas Holdings | $1.9B | 8% | 8.6% | 24% |
| NWNNorthwest Natural | $1.3B | 7% | — | 30% |
| CPKChesapeake Utilities Corporation | $930M | 11% | 13.3% | 20% |
| Group median | — | 9% | 8.6% | 27% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Chesapeake Utilities Corporation has delivered.
Chesapeake Utilities Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Chesapeake Utilities Corporation earns about $145M on its 15.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($194M) on 24M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-08-03; net debt $1.4B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($502M) runs well above depreciation ($92M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $216M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CPHI its page in the Manual CPNG →
Industry order: ← CLNE the Gas Utilities chapter NJR →