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JLL, Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated
Revenue is led by Real Estate Management Services (77%) and Leasing Advisory (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
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Through LaSalle Investment Management (also referred to as "LaSalle" or our "Investment Management" segment), we invest for clients on a global basis in both private assets and publicly traded real estate securities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. That margin has held in a narrow 2.8%–5.4% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Real Estate Management Services is 77% of revenue, with Leasing Advisory the other meaningful segment at 12%.
- Real Estate Management Services77%$20.0B
- Leasing Advisory12%$3.0B
- Capital Markets Services9%$2.4B
- Investment Management2%$450M
- Proptech Investments1%$232M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $13.0B | $14.5B | $16.3B | $18.0B | $16.6B | $19.4B | $20.9B | $20.8B | $23.4B | $26.1B | $27.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| $330M | $276M | $485M | $535M | $403M | $962M | $655M | $225M | $547M | $792M | $999M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $142M | $167M | $186M | $202M | $226M | $218M | $228M | $238M | $256M | $253M | $229M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $223M | $799M | $604M | $484M | $1.1B | $972M | $200M | $576M | $785M | $1.2B | $1.4B | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| $29M | $33M | $38M | $43M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 13% | 4% | 6% | 9% | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | — | 0% | Dividend / operating cashPayout |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($806M) | ($171M) | ($280M) | ($1.0B) | ($171M) | ($806M) | ($243M) | ($290M) | ($317M) | ($337M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $636M | ($624M) | ($141M) | $585M | ($771M) | ($144M) | ($13M) | ($374M) | ($451M) | ($643M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($7M) | $13M | ($20M) | ($800K) | $15M | ($21M) | ($39M) | $6M | ($28M) | $32M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $47M | $18M | $163M | $18M | $188M | $2M | ($96M) | ($83M) | ($11M) | $246M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $7.6B | $9.3B | $10.0B | $13.7B | $14.3B | $15.5B | $15.6B | $16.1B | $16.8B | $17.8B | $17.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.3B | $753M | $688M | $1.3B | $755M | $956M | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $890M | $1.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.0B | $485M | $207M | $846M | $181M | $363M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $782M | $291M | $1.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $4.8B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $8.5B | $8.7B | $9.1B | $9.4B | $9.7B | $9.9B | $10.2B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $7M | $4M | $0 | $9M | $8M | $8M | $7M | — | — | — | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| $25M | $38M | $43M | $87M | $89M | $229M | $122M | $116M | $124M | $120M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.7B | $5.1B | $5.5B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.8B | $7.5B | $7.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 45.5M | 45.8M | 45.9M | 49.2M | 52.3M | 52.1M | 49.3M | 48.3M | 48.4M | 48.3M | 47.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.65 | $0.72 | $0.82 | $0.87 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $61.27 | $72.99 | $80.37 | $104.12 | $105.60 | $118.78 | $122.03 | $130.34 | $139.99 | $155.30 | $157.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.4%/yr | +11.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +112.0%/yr (2-yr) | +112.0%/yr (2-yr) |
| EPS | +9.5%/yr | +16.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −31.6%/yr (2-yr) | −31.6%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | +10.9%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $306M · 0.3× operating profitModest net debtCash $599M − debt $905M
What this means
Netting $599M of cash and short-term investments against $905M of debt leaves $306M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (0.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 7%–13%; 11% latest = NOPAT $886M ÷ invested capital $7.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $792M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.0%The count is edging downStock compensation $3M (fiscal 2025), 0.0% of revenue · repurchases $212M · diluted shares -2.1% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $26.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $905M vs $793M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +43%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.33/share (latest year $17.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $163.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 4% lately, median 4%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · 2.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.7%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$458M
- Receivables$2.2B
- Other current assets$5.1B
- Debt due within a year$200M
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$5.5B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.8B, of which the leases are 51%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $1.3B of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2012 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $12.9M | $33.1M | $962M |
| 2022 | $12.1M | −$7.8M | $655M |
| 2023 | $12.0M | $10.6M | $225M |
| 2024 | $17.0M | $32.4M | $547M |
| 2025 | $14.7M | $40.3M | $792M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio243:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.0% of revenue, equal to 0.2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CBRECBRE Group Inc Common Stock Class A | $40.5B | 22% | 4.8% | 12% | 4% |
| JLLJones Lang LaSalle Incorporated | $26.1B | — | 3.9% | 9% | 3%3y |
| BEKEKE Holdings Inc | $14.0B | 24% | 0.4% | 2% | 9% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | — | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 8% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| Group median | — | — | 2.2% | 4% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated has delivered.
Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings — on 46M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $1.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← JKHY its page in the Manual JNJ →
Industry order: ← IRS the Real Estate Development & Services chapter MMI →